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Introduction
How should a monopolist price a durable good or a new technology that is subject to network externalities? Should the monopolist use declining prices to skim o consumer surplus, or, alternatively, should it launch the product with l o w \ i n t roductory" prices to attract a \critical mass" of adopters? These important q u e s t ions have received surprisingly little attention from the economics literature.
In this paper, w e p r o vide intuition as to when and why i n troductory pricing can occur in the presence of network externalities. Specically, w e consider a monopolist selling a durable good that confers a network externality on a collection o f rational buyers. Our principal goal is to establish plausible environments in which e q uilibrium prices increase over time.
Early development of telephone service supplies a near-perfect example of a monopoly over a service having network externalities. A user derives value from a communications network i n proportion to the total number of subscribers. The telephone system in the U.S. was a monopoly based on the 1876 patents over basic telephone technology. A v erage m o n thly fees charged by the unregulated telephone companies rose s t eadily in the early 1880s, nearly doubling over a four-year period. Thereafter the price path 1 attened, only to plummet when the patents expired in 1893.
On-line information services oer a more up-to-date illustration o f introductory pricing. F irst CompuServe, and later Prodigy, w ere introduced with a s m all sign-up charge and a low m o n thly fee. As the customer base grew, the services raised prices gradually. Users need not be connected by a p h ysical network to realize network externalities. For instance, users of computer operating systems and some general purpose applications packages receive a n indirect externality as complementary hardware and software products become available. Computer vendors adopt marketing practices designed to take advantage of this externality. Makers o f n e w h a rdware platforms are known to oer especially attractive l i censing terms to early developers of compatible software. Penetration pricing is a lso a common strategy w h e n i n t roducing new software operating systems and other general p urpose software f or which network 2 externalities are important. New versions of existing programs are typically shipped to software developers at negligible cost to encourage them to write compatible applications. Introductory pricing works to enhance the product's q u a lity b y attracting these \lead users."
These examples suggest that introductory pricing may b e a n optimal pricing strategy when network externalities prevail. Our goal is precisely t o describe situations in which i n t roductory pricing is an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, in the models we present, introductory pricing fails to occur unless network externalities a r e p r esent. I n t his way w e h a v e b e e n a b l e t o isolate the role played by n e t w ork externalities in introductory pricing.
Our paper draws on t hree lines of previous research. The rst is the growing literature on the adoption of innovations with n etwork externalities. Farrell and Saloner (1985) , Arthur (1989) , and others examine equilibrium adoption of \unsponsored" (or nonproprietary) innovations, ignoring the issue of pricing. Katz and Shapiro ( 1 985, 1986) , on the other hand, consider the pricing of competing \sponsored" (or proprietary) innovations. They also n d i n troductory pricing in equilibrium, but these l o w r st-period prices are caused by a duopolist's desire to establish an installed base ahead o f i t s 3 rival's technology.
The second line of research is the vast literature that endeavors t o v erify the so-called \Coase conjecture" regarding a monopolist selling a durable 4 good. Coase (1972) claimed that the price set by a monopolist who is unable to commit to future prices will quickly converge to marginal cost as the interval between successive selling periods becomes very short. The Coase conjecture w as conrmed and disconrmed under a variety of conditions. In all cases the equilibrium solutions obey what Hart and Tirole (1991) call \Coasian dynamics." Coasian dynamics consist of t w o properties: (i) higher valuation adopters make their purchase no later than l o w er valuation adopters (the skimming p r operty) a nd (ii) equilibrium price is nonincreasing over time ( the price monotonicity property). In this paper, we show that the second property need not always hold when network externalities exist.
Finally, t he Marketing Science literature has examined pricing with \ex-5 perience" or \network" eects. These papers typically assume that buyers obey some rule that is not necessarily rational, or alternatively that they are imperfectly informed about the existence or the quality o f the good. By contrast, we a ssume that b u y ers are perfectly rational agents. We begin our analysis with the case of perfect information in Section 2. We s h o w that, i f e a c h buyer is \small", then discounted prices must decrease over time. In other words, Coasian dynamics must hold. If, instead, consumers are \large", we can construct examples in which discounted prices rise over time b y carefully selecting from among multiple equilibria.
In Section 3 , w e assume imperfect information about consumers' valuations. Again we treat the cases of small and large buyers separately. I n b o t h cases, we nd equilibria in which prices increase over time. Now, however, the intuition f o r the result diers between the two cases. When buyers are small, the inducement o f a l o w rst-period price is needed to compensate for the uncertainty of an early adoption. When buyers are large, however, delaying a purchase can actually increase the probability that other buyers will eventually adopt. In this case the rm sets a l o w er rst-period price to counteract the tendency to delay.
Finally, in Section 4 w e let the rm's cost be unknown to b u y ers. Again, we nd perfect Bayesian equilibria in which prices rise over time. In this case, introductory prices serve as a signal of l o w cost, thus raising early buyers' expectations about the likelihood of future sales. The lower the seller's cost is, the bigger future sales will be, and thus the higher the expected utility of a purchase today is.
The Certainty C ase
We begin by assuming that there is perfect information about demand, cost, and the quality o f t h e p r oduct. However, we a ssume that the monopolist is unable to set prices based on buyers' types, either because it cannot observe some individual characteristic, or because it is precluded from price discrimination.
Each b u y er's valuation of the good depends on her type as well as on the number of o ther buyers who have purchased the good|the essence of a network externality. This may be represented as u (n ) t he utility derived by i t consumer i given the cumulative n umber of purchases through period t, n .
t Each adopter demands at m o st one unit. And since there is no possibility of resale, a buyer will make a purchase in a period only if she had not done so earlier. Once purchased, the good provides a stream of benets that each consumer discounts according to the discount f a ctor . F inally, w e deduct the current price, p , to arrive at the net payo. We s a y t hat a buyer is \small" when her decision to purchase the good has no eect on the payo to other buyers or o n the strategies they choose. This would be true if there w ere a countably or uncountably innite n umber of them. A buyer is \large" if her decision t o purchase has a noticeable eect on other buyers' payos and decisions. This section demonstrates that the occurrence of introductory pricing depends on the \size" of b u y ers. eects. The same result does not hold, however, if buyers are large. An example is presented in the Appendix where discounted prices are increasing along a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The example exploits the multiplicity of equilibria under network externalities: buyers coordinate their purchases so as to \punish" any deviations from equilibrium of the sort considered in 7 the pro o f o f P r o position 1 .
Specically, the equilibrium calls for one buyer to make a purchase in period 1, while three other buyers purchase in period 2 at a higher price. If a period-2 buyer advances her purchase to period 1, then the remaining period-2 buyers \punish" her by not p u r c hasing in period 2. This constitutes 8 a Nash equilibrium of the period-2 subgame, though not the only one.
In the next sections w e explore how uncertainty a b o ut demand and cost can result in introductory pricing. Once again we consider separately the cases of \large" and \small" buyers, but now increasing prices are possible in both cases. Production cost is assumed to b e z e r o. This setup is similar to the model of i n complete information presented in Farrell and Saloner (1985) . The principal distinction is that we c o nsider a proprietary innovation which is therefore priced. Farrell and Saloner consider an \unsponsored" innovation, thus concentrating on issues of buyer 9 coordination.
We f ocus on i n terior equilibria in which, with probability strictly between 0 and 1, a sale is made in each p e r iod (provided there is unsatised demand). This restriction i m poses bounds on the values of , t he discount factor, and of u, t he measure of network externalities.
Basically, in order for the solution to be interior, and u cannot be too large. If is large, then only a corner solution exists in which no sales occur in the rst period. In this extreme case it makes no sense to talk about the evolution of equilibrium prices since no sales are m a de at the initial price.
If, o n t he other hand, u is very large, then the network externality s w a mps the uncertainty a n d t he standalone value, and so all consumers who buy will buy early on. Again, the oer of higher second period prices is not exercised.
For an o pen set of values of and u, h o w ever, we can show t hat a unique Perfect Bayesian E quilibrium exists that displays introductory pricing with certainty.
Proposition 2 If 0 < u < 1 = 2 and is close to (but lower than) (u), 4(1 0 u) + 2 u ( 1 0 u ) 0 u then there exists a u n ique, interior Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which with probability 1 discounted price i n t h e s e c ond p eriod exceeds price i n t h e rst period.
The proof of the result is in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows.
Consider rst the case when 1 and u = 0 . I t i s w ell known from the literature on bargaining and durable goods pricing that a monopoly seller will not price discriminate o v er time. Accordingly, b u y ers will choose to wait to purchase since utility i s n o t d iscounted and they retain the option of a better outcome. Consequently, discounted prices are nearly constant o v er time and almost no sales occur in the rst period.
Now suppose that u > 0. Network externalities introduce a new factor into the buyers' d e cision besides the time prole of prices. A buyer must weigh the impact of her decision on the likelihood that t he other buyer will purchase. A s s h o wn in the proof, by f oregoing a purchase in the rst period, the likelihood of a sale in the second period to the other buyer actually increases. The reason is that, if no sales occur in the rst period, then both buyers' combined willingness to pay is smaller since neither one is guaranteed the network externality if she buys. For this reason, the seller nds it optimal to set a price much l o w er if no sale occurs in the rst period compared to when a sale does occur. In contrast to b u y ers, the seller prefers t o make a l l s ales in the rst period. Although d elaying the purchase increases expected network size, it also decreases expected prots. Therefore, the seller has an incentive t o lower rst-period prices so a s t o d i s courage buyers from delaying rst-period purchases in an a ttempt to force low second-period prices.
When the discount factor i s s u ciently small, it can e a sily be shown that equilibrium price decreases with probability o ne. The intuition is straightforward. If the future is heavily discounted, the only dierence between periods is that in the second period, with positive probability, the monopolist will have l o w ered its priors with respect to the buyers' valuations, w hich in turn leads to l o w er prices. It follows by continuity that for intermediate values of and u, equilibrium price increases or decreases with positive probability.
There is an interesting parallel between the equilibrium just described and the one found in Farrell and Saloner's ( 1 985) adoption game with n e tw o rk externalities. I n b o th cases, medium-valuation adopters play \band-wagon" strategies: to adopt (or buy) in the second period if and only if an adoption (purchase) was made in the rst period.
Finally, it can also be shown that in equilibrium, whatever the magnitudes of t he network externality a nd the discount factor, the equilibrium is inecient: welfare-increasing adoptions are delayed from period 1 to period 2, or, i n s o me cases, never made. This is not surprising in light o f F a rrell and Saloner's \excess inertia" result for unsponsored innovations. When the rm prices a proprietary innovation, the equilibrium can very well be less ecient|and it is.
Demand Uncertainty and Lead Users
Here we a gain make t he assumption of \small" buyers. Specically, w e a ssume there is a continuum of buyers w ho can purchase in one of two periods.
Each buyer can be one of t w o t ypes: H or L. A crucial assumption is that only H-type buyers confer network benets on other buyers. Accordingly, we can treat these buyers as \lead users," t o b o rrow a common term in the marketing literature. They contribute in a decisive w a y to the amount o f complementary products and services that generate network benets. For example, if the basic product was a new software operating system, then the lead users w ould be developers of software applications.
H The utility o f a H -type buyer is given by u = v +x, where x is the mea-L sure of H-type buyers. L-type buyers r eceive utility u = x. F o r s implicity, we a ssume there is no discounting or interim utility, so all that m atters to buyers is the nal number of H-type adopters and the price paid.
The measure of H-type buyers is given by . T h e v alue of is uncertain to both buyers and seller. It can take on the value or . B o th buyers and seller hold a common prior probability that = . Finally, t he seller has a constant marginal cost c.
Proposition 3 Suppose that < c < < + v (2) v < (1 0 )( 0 c):
If is suciently low, then there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which expected s e c ond-period price i s higher than the rst-period price.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. It is worth noting that t he set of parameter values determined by ( 2 ){(3) is non-empty. F or instance, they are satised by = 0 , c = : 1, = :2, and v = :3.
The intuition f o r this result can be seen in the following way. The new product can either be a success or a failure (or \good" or \bad"), corresponding to whether the measure o f \lead users" is high or low. In equilibrium, this is known a t t he beginning of period 2. If the product is \good", then the seller prices low i n o r der to attract the largest fraction of buyers. If, on the contrary, t he product is \bad", then the seller sets a high pricing, knowing that he will o nly sell to high-valuation consumers. Now, high-valuation consumers are more optimistic than the seller about the possibility that the product is \good" and a low price will be set in period 2. Therefore, in order for them to buy in the rst period, t he seller has to set a price which is lower that h i s ( t he seller's) expected second-period price.
4 Asymmetric information about cost Our last explanation for introductory pricing hinges on asymmetric information about production costs. Specically, w e suppose consumers are not perfectly informed about the seller's unit cost. Since we w ant to concentrate on the eects of asymmetric information, we a v oid the issue of consumer's timing of purchases by assuming that the monopolist is selling to two consumers who arrive sequentially.
Each consumer can be one of two t ypes: high valuation (type h) o r l o w v a luation (type l) with probability and 10, respectively. A high valuation consumer has a utility o f v if she is the only one to buy the product, and v +u if both consumers buy the product. A low-valuation consumer receives 0 utility if she is the only one to buy the product and u if both consumers 10 buy. U t ilities are realized after both adoption decisions have been made. Finally, the seller can be of two t ypes, high cost (c, t ype H) and low cost (zero, type L). The seller's cost is unknown to buyers at the time of 11 purchase. In this event w e once again nd an equilibrium in which the seller sets an increasing price sequence. Then, there exists at least one Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with separation (i.e., dierent types of rms setting d i erent prices in the rst period). Furthermore, e very separating equilibrium has the property that the low-cost rm sets rst-period price b elow second-period price.
One such equilibrium has the low-cost rm setting rst-period price equal The formal proof o f P r oposition 4 may b e f o und in the Appendix. The proof is by construction. We rst show that Condition (4) implies that, assuming a sale was made in period 1, the monopolist w ill optimally sell to both types of buyer in period 2 if it has low c o st, but only to t he highvaluation buyer if it has high cost.
Knowing this, and given that there are network externalities, a buyer's expected utility (and willingness to pay) in the rst period is higher the more she believes the seller to be a low-cost rm. This, in turn, creates an incentive for high-cost sellers to masquerade as low-cost s e l l ers in the rst period. Finally, t o d i s t inguish itself from a high-cost seller, the low-cost seller has to set a very low price in period 1. Conditions (5) guarantees that separation is an equilibrium.
We should note that this equilibrium is very similar to t h e o ne found in Bagwell (1989) . In his model, consumers must decide whether, after visiting the seller in the rst period, to incur a xed cost to return in the second period. Bagwell nds that a seller will employ i n troductory pricing to signal low c o st. First-period consumers return to the seller when they the seller is low cost, and hence, w ill charge l o w second-period price. In our model rstperiod consumers care about future prices to the extent that the probability of future purchases by other consumers depends on future prices.
Finally, notice that while w e h a v e only considered separating equilibria, it is fairly straightforward to c o nstruct pooling equilibria in which b o t h t ypes of sellers c h oose the same rst-period price. The conditions for a p o o l i ng equilibrium to exist depend on the probability that buyers are of type h as well as on the other parameters of the model. There can be two classes of pooling equilibria: One in which only h types buy in the rst period, and another in which both h and l types buy in the rst period. A straightforward but tedious argument shows that increasing prices can occur in both kinds of p o o l i ng equilibria.
Conclusion
We h a v e constructed models of pricing a durable good or a new technology that confers network externalities. The models overturn the price m o n otonicity property that is a key element o f C o asian dynamics: in each c a se 12 discounted price rises over time. In addition, discounted prices did not r i se whenever network externalities vanished, underscoring t he close connection between introductory pricing and network externalities.
These results were derived in settings that were deliberately neutral to-ward introductory p r icing. There is no cost escalation or growing demand that would justify increasing prices. N o r do our models allow for intertemporal competition that is often responsible for low initial prices.
There is an interesting question not resolved in this paper: G iven that network externalities can work to reverse the direction of Coasian dynamics, could they also refute the Coase conjecture itself? If our work is any indication, plausible demand and cost conditions may c a ll for p r ice to rise initially. Soon thereafter, however, the power of Coasian dynamics will prevail, causing prices to soon a fter fall toward marginal cost. The extent o f such a price cycle remains an open issue. With the following example, we s h o w t h a t if buyers are large, then there may exist equilibria with increasing prices. Suppose that the monopolist sells i n t w o periods to four potential buyers. Table 1 but receive positive network benets u 0. It is crucial f o r the result that dierent t ypes derive d i erent u t ility from the network eect, and that the B-type buyers b e n e t from the network externality only when all four of the consumers purchase the good. Production cost is a constant c per unit.
It can be shown that, if u = 0 (i.e., n o n e t w ork externalities), then equilibrium prices must be decreasing, consistent with Coasian dynamics. We will now a rgue that, if u > 0 and if other conditions hold, then there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium such that discounted prices increase over time. The additional conditions are: We propose strategies for the seller and the buyers that together form an equilibrium:
The A-type buys as soon as price is lower than v . T o see that the designated strategies form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, notice rst that the A-type gets a zero equilibrium payo. Any deviation from these strategies would make her worse o since p = p if she 2 1 does not buy in period 1. The B-types' strategies at a n y period-2 subgame clearly constitute a Nash equilibrium: either all adopt and each has willingness t o p a y Finally, let us check t hat the monopolist's s t rategy is optimal. In period 2, and assuming that the A-type did not p u r c hase earlier, p = v extracts 2 a the most surplus the monopolist can get from the A-type; to attract additional buyers, she would have to set p v , which w ould result in a negative 1 b Condition ( 6 ) e n s ures that the rm breaks even. We t h us conclude that the designated strategies constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; and that, along this equilibrium, price increases from period 1 to period 2.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We b e g in by noting that Lemma 10.1 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) where (p 0u0v )=v is the equilibrium probability that a sale will occur in 1 1 2 the second period given that a sale occurred in the rst period. Substituting u , a nd so v > v . I n w o rds, the likelihood that a buyer will purchase in the 2 2 second period i s higher when no sales were made in the rst than i f s o me had occurred. This apparent contradiction is understandable when one notices that the second-period price is lower in absence of a n y e a r lier sales. Unsure that they will capture the network externality, buyers' aggregate willingness to pay i s l o w er. Accordingly, t he seller is compelled to charge lower prices when no sales are made in the rst period.
Having found the solution to both second-period subgames, we n o w t urn to the rst period. The indierent buyer's valuation, v , is given by 
On the left-hand side, we h a v e expected net utility from a purchase in the rst period. For a p rice of p , the marginal buyer receives a standalone >From (19) we c a n s h o w that p is increasing in v , so that we can form In that case, the condition f o r i n t roductory pricing to occur in equilibrium is just 0 1
(1 0 ) + u(v 0v )<0; Substituting (11), (12), (16), and (17) ensuring that discounted price strictly increases with probability one.
Since the equilibrium value of v is an increasing function o f , it follows 1 by continuity that if is lower but suciently close to (u) then the equilibrium is interior (that is, v < 1) and discounted price strictly increases with 1 probability o ne. (1 0 ) respectively. In words, being of the H type makes a buyer more optimistic about the measure of H types; conversely, being of the L type makes the L H buyer more pessimistic about the measure of H types: < < . The seller has three possibilities. One is to induce both types to buy in the same period (pooling equilibrium). A second one is to induce H types to buy in the rst period and L types in the second period. Lastly it could sell to H types only.
Consider rst a pooling equilbrium. The highest price the seller can L L charge is given by t h e L t ypes' expected utility, n a mely + ( 1 0 ) . However, since < c b y Condition 2, this price is lower than cost for a suciently low . Consider now a separating equilibrium. In the second period, the measure of adopters in the rst period will be known. Based on this value, the seller and the remaining buyers will form a posterior on t he value of . I f = (i.e., the posterior puts weigh 1 on the value = ), then the best the seller can do is to set p = p () = . It will then sell to the remaining 2 2 1 0 consumers (recall that, by assumption, > c ). If, on the contrary, = , then no price above cost will induce the L types to buy because, by a s sumption, < c . In equilibrium, any price above is indierent f rom the seller's perspective. We assume p = p () = + v , 2 2 as this is the only price that survives the possibility that some H types might have remained to the second period. (Alternatively, w e might assume that a fraction of H types are only born in period 2.) Notice that, given our assumption that + v > , the second period price is higher when = , that is, p () > p ( ).
and still have the high-valuation consumers make a purchase is given by implies that the separating equilibrium is preferable.
Proof of Proposition 4: Since we are interested in nding Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, w e b e g in by c o nsidering the monopolist's problem in the second period. Suppose that the rst-period consumer has bought the good. Then, expected prots in the second period for the high-cost monopolist will be (u + v 0 c) if she sets a high price (p = u + v), and u 0 c 2 if she sets a low p r ice (p = u). (One can easily check t hat no other price 2 can be optimal for the seller.) By the rst part of (4), we conclude that it is optimal for the high-cost monopolist to set a high price in the second period, so that a second adoption occurs with probability conditional on a rst adoption having occurred. A s i m ilar p r oblem arises for the low-cost rm, with the dierence that production cost is zero. Given the second part of (4), we c o nclude that it is optimal for a l o w-cost rm to set price equal to u in the second period, so that a second adoption occurs w ith probability 1 conditional on a rst adoption having occurred.
Finally, if no purchase has occurred in the rst period, then both types 14 of rms set p = v.
2 Condition (4) is crucial for the equilibrium that we will derive. If the rst-period consumer believes the rm has low costs, then she will expect a l o w p r ice to be set in the second period, and a second adoption to occur with probability 1 . This implies that her expected valuation equals u+v (or simply u, if she is a low-valuation type). If, on the contrary, the consumer believes the seller has high costs, then her expected valuation is only u+v (or u, if she is a low-valuation t ype).
14 If v < c , t hen the high-cost rm sets p = c. In what follows, we will assume that If there is no uncertainty about the rm's costs, then the optimal price for the rst period is easy t o derive. A low-cost rm will set a price equal t o u , whereas a high-cost rm will set a price equal to u + v. N o t ice that the rst-period price set by a l o w-cost rm is equal t o i t s second period price, that is, introductory pricing does not occur. Also, the expected second-period price set by a high-cost rm is equal to the price set in the rst period.
We construct equilibria with separation, that is, equilibria in which d i fferent t ypes of sellers set dierent rst-period prices. In equilibrium, if each seller sets the designated price, consumers will form posterior beliefs that assign probability 1 to the respective t ype. If any out-of-equilibrium price is set, then|we assume|consumers believe that the rm has h igh costs w i t h probability 1.
Given this, the conditions for an equilibrium include: (i) A high-cost rm has no incentive to imitate a l o w c o s t r m b y setting price at the level a l o w c o st rm would choose, nor w o uld a high-cost rm set any o t her price which consumers w ould interpret as indicating the rm has high costs; (ii) A low-cost rm has no incentive to set any price dierent f r om the designated price, given that i t w ould then be believed to be a high-cost type. H Suppose that, in the rst period, the high-cost rm sets a price p = L u + v; and let p denote the rst-period price set by the low-cost rm at the equilibrium we construct. To c heck condition (i), we h a v e t o c o nsider two p o ssible deviations for the high-cost rm. One is for it to set a price equal t o t he low-cost rm's equilibrium price. 
L so that the second part of (5) implies the equilibrium hypothesis p < u .
The second possible deviation price for the high-cost rm is u. A t this price, both types of consumers will buy i n t he rst period. H o w ever, the rst part of (5), together with (36), imply that this is not optimal: compare prot of 1(u 0 c) + (u + v 0 c) w i t h t he left hand side of (36).
Intuitively, the high-cost rm is following its rst-best action in equilibrium. Therefore, if a buyer is to deviate, it must be that her posterior is aected by the seller's deviation, which only occurs i f p rice is set equal t o L p . 15 There exists a continuum of separating e q u i l i bria with d ierent low-cost-rm prices p L less or equal to p . T he one we are considering is the unique separating equilibrium that survives Cho and Kreps' (1987) \intuitive" criterion. Note, however, that introductory pricing occurs in any separating equilibrium.
which is equivalent to the rst part of (5).
Finally, Condition (37) veries that the low-cost rm engages in introductory pricing.
